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Abstract. We have previously presented initial results of a case study which illustrated an 
approach to engineering protective wrappers as a means of detecting errors or unwanted behaviour 
in systems employing an OTS (Off-The-Shelf) item. The case study used a Simulink model of a 
steam boiler system together with an OTS PID (Proportional, Integral and Derivative) controller. 
The protective wrappers are developed for the model of the system in such a way that they allow 
detection and tolerance of typical errors caused by unavailability of signals, violations of range 
limitations, and oscillations. In this paper we extend the case study to demonstrate how forward 
error recovery based on exception handling can be systematically incorporated at the level of the 
protective wrappers. 
1 Introduction 
Although integration of Off-The-Shelf (OTS) components into systems with high dependability 
requirements (including those that are safety-critical) is becoming a viable option for system 
developers, care must be taken to avoid a deterioration in overall system dependability. OTS 
components are often of a lower quality than bespoke components, may not have been specifically 
intended for the environment in which they are to be employed, and may be poorly documented. These 
factors all contribute to a higher risk of failure for complex systems employing OTS components. 
It must be accepted both that OTS components will be employed in such systems, and that their use 
will be a source of failure in spite of all efforts to improve the quality of OTS components and of the 
system in which they are to be integrated. The solution we advocate is to employ specialised fault 
tolerance techniques for integration of OTS components into complex systems. 
1.1 Protective Wrappers 
In previous work [1,7] we illustrated an approach to the development of protective wrappers, a bespoke 
software module which intercepts all information going to and from an OTS item. This approach is 
developed further in this paper using the same case study. 
Fault tolerance techniques have three main phases: error detection, error diagnosis and error recovery 
[5]. The first phase identifies an erroneous state; error diagnosis is then used to examine and assess the 
damaged area, to enable it to be replaced by an error-free state during error recovery. We have 
previously concentrated on detection and diagnosis, providing only limited recovery actions.  
Component wrapping is an established technique used to intercept data and control flow between a 
component and its environment [6]. A protective wrapper may detect errors or suspicious activities, 
and initiate appropriate recovery when possible, and must be rigorously specified, developed and 
executed as a means of protecting OTS items against faults in the Rest Of the System (ROS), and the 
ROS against faults in OTS items. Sources of information for wrapper development include 
specification of the OTS item behaviour, known “erroneous” behaviour of the OTS item, and 
specification of the correct behaviour of the ROS with respect to the OTS item. 
1.2 Case Study 
The case study used in this paper concerns the development of a protective wrapper for an Off-The-
Shelf PID (Proportional, Integral and Derivative) controller. This case study is intended to illustrate 
how the approach could be applied in practice, employing software models of the PID controller and 
the steam boiler system rather than conducting a potentially risky experiment in a real-world 
 2
Outputs from OTS 
Steam Load 
Coal Quality Inputs to OTS 
environment. Use of such software models is an active area of research and development carried out by 
many leading control product companies (including Honeywell [8]), and we use a third-party model of 
a steam boiler in this case study. We believe that this decision adds credibility to our results. The model 
simulates a real controller and steam boiler system, enabling us to investigate the effect of wrapping 
with a representative model. In the course of our work we have extended the model by incorporating 
protective wrappers.  
1.3 Roadmap 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the following section we describe the simulation 
environment, the controller and the boiler models we are using, and our approach to monitoring the 
model variables. Section 3 discusses the requirements for a protective wrapper to be developed and 
outlines the causes of errors to be detected and tolerated at the level of the wrapper. The next three 
sections discuss design and implementation of the wrapper to detect, diagnose and select an appropriate 
recovery action for errors caused by unavailability of signals, violations of range limits, and signal 
oscillations. Section 7 concludes the paper by discussing the generic error recovery strategy and the 
possible effects of wrappers executing on the overall execution of the integrated system.  
2 Simulation 
2.1 Simulink 
Simulink (Mathworks) [10] is one of the built-in tools in MATLAB, providing a platform for 
modelling, simulating, and analysing dynamical systems. It supports linear and nonlinear systems 
modelled in continuous time and sampled time, as well as a hybrid of the two. Systems can also be 
multi-rate, i.e., have different parts that are sampled or updated at different rates. Simulink contains a 
comprehensive block library of sinks, sources, linear and nonlinear components, and connectors to 
allow modelling of very sophisticated systems. Models can also be developed through self-defined 
blocks by means of the S-functions feature of Simulink or by invoking MATLAB functions. After a 
model has been defined, it can be simulated and, using scopes and other display blocks, simulation 
results can be displayed while the simulation is running.  
Simulink provides a practical and safe platform for simulating the boiler system and its PID control 
system, for detecting operational errors when boiler and control system interact, and for developing and 
implementing a protective wrapper dealing with such errors. 
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2.2 The Structure of the Model 
The abstract structure of the system we are modelling is shown in Fig. 1. The overall system has two 
principal components: the boiler system and the control system. In turn, the control system comprises a 
PID controller (the OTS item), and the ROS which is simply the remainder of the control system. 
The ROS consists of : 
• the boiler sensors. These are “smart” sensors which monitor variables providing input to the PID 
controller: Drum Level, Steam Flow, Steam Pressure, Gas Concentrations and Coal Feeder Rate; 
• actuators. These devices control a heating burner which can be ON/OFF, and adjust inlet/outlet 
valves in response to outputs from the PID controller: Feed Water Flow, Coal Feeder Rate and Air 
Flow; 
• configuration settings. These are the “set-points” for the system: oxygen and bus pressure, which 
must be set up in advance by the operators. 
Smart sensors and actuators interact with the PID controller through a standard protocol. Simulink 
output blocks can be introduced into the model in such a way that the variables of the MATLAB 
working space can be controlled as necessary. Working with the Simulink model we were able to 
perform repeatable experiments by manipulating any of the changeable variables and the connections 
between system components so as to produce and analyse a range of possible errors that would be 
reasonably typical for the simulated system. 
2.3 The Simulink Model 
The Simulink model (shown in Fig. 2) actually represents the OTS item as three separate PID 
controllers that deal with the feed water flow, the coal feeder rate and the air flow. These controllers 
output three eponymous variables: Feed Water Flow (F_wf), Coal Feeder Rate (C_fr) and Air Flow 
(Air_f); these three variables, together with two external variables (Coal Quality and Steam Load) 
constitute the parameters which determine the behaviour of the boiler system. There are also several 
internal variables generated by the smart sensors; some of these, together with the configuration set-
points, provide the inputs to the PID controllers. Table 1 lists all of the variables used in the model. 
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Fig. 2. Simulink Model of the Boiler System with PID Controllers 
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2.4 Variable Monitoring 
Simulink scopes and other display blocks enable us to develop modelling components that observe the 
intermediate results while the simulation is running. In our experiments we can monitor and display a 
total of 15 variables, comprising all of the variables listed in Table 1 (except for the two set-points), 
plus three internal variables which represent two internal air flows and one internal steam flow. The 
simulation time for all of our experiments is set to 12000 steps. Some monitoring results are presented 
in Fig. 3. In particular, this chart demonstrates the behaviour of the three PID outputs and two external 
inputs of the boiler system when at step 2000 the steam load is increased, and at step 5000 the coal 
quality changes: in both these scenarios the boiler system returns to steady operation reasonably soon.  
Table 1. Variables used in the model 
Variable  Representation  Variable  Representation 
Coal Quality Coal quality, ton per hour   D_l Drum level 
Steam Load Steam Load, fraction of pure 
combustibles 
 
 
S_f Steam flow 
F_wf Feed water flow  P_d Steam pressure / drum 
C_fr Coal feeder rate  P_b Steam pressure / bus 
Air_f Air flow (controlled air)  O2eco O2 concentration at 
economizer 
P_ref Bus pressure set-point  COeco CO concentration at 
economizer 
O2_ref O2 set-point    NOxeco NOx concentration at 
economizer 
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Fig. 3. Normal Performance of the Boiler System with PID Controllers 
2.5 Properties of the Boiler System and the PID Controllers 
In this section we summarise the information which we collected to guide us in developing the 
protective wrappers. The basic boiler specification provides information on steam flow, bus pressure, 
output temperature and coal calorific value. As the OTS item (the PID controller(s)) is treated as a 
black box, any information about its properties must be deduced from the interface or from relevant 
sources where available. In an ideal world the system designer would have a complete and correct 
specification of the boiler system, the PID controller and the ROS. Unfortunately, we only had access 
to limited information about the boiler system and the ROS (which is typical for many practical 
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situations). From an investigation of the boiler model and information acquired from all available 
sources, we have formulated the following description. 
Information from the documentation available to us is as follows:  
• Output temperature 540 deg C 
• Coal calorific value 16-18 MJ/kg  
• Steam load      50-125 ton/hour 
• Coal quality is measured as a fraction of pure combustibles (where pure = 1; actual value about 
0.55-0.7) 
• Three controlled outputs (F_wf, C_fr, Air_f) are given as a percentage 
Information obtained by analysing the interface and by investigating the simulated model: 
• Set-point of bus pressure ranges from 0 to 20 (usual value about 9.4) 
• Set-point of O2 concentration at economiser ranges from 0 to 0.1 (usual value about 0.03) 
• Internal variables input to PID controllers:  
• Drum level: output value between -1 and +1 (usual value close to 0) 
• Steam Flow: 0 to 125 
• Bus pressure:  0 to 20  
• O2 concentration at economiser:  0 to 0.5 
3 Requirements for a Protective Wrapper 
In the previous section we presented an outline characterisation of the boiler system, as deduced from 
the model and other sources. In the following sections we consider the errors which could arise from 
integrating an OTS PID controller in the system, in order to derive requirements for a protective 
wrapper. We make the following assumptions: 
• The value of each variable can be checked instantaneously through microprocessors. In particular, 
we assume that the values of input and output variables of the PID controller are available 
instantaneously. This (highly) simplifying assumption enables us to illustrate the method for 
protective wrapper development without regard to issues relating to response times. 
• The wrapper program can be inserted into the control system, either by a partial hardware 
implementation which intercepts the physical connections, or purely in software. We are not 
concerned at this stage with the details of this implementation. 
In order to clarify the requirements for a protective wrapper, it is necessary to form a view of what the 
PID controller and the ROS should, and should not, do at the interface between them. This view can be 
formulated as a collection of Acceptable Behaviour Constraints (ABCs) [7] defined from the 
perspective of the systems integrator. Once defined, these ABCs can be thought of as contracts [11] 
which a system designer could use as the basis for defining a protective wrapper, which can then 
employ conventional mechanisms for error detection, containment and recovery [2].  
4 Safe Boiler Operation 
Many aspects of the operation of the boiler and control system, such as the flow of gases, fuelling, 
pressures and levels, could lead to a failure of some type. However, some features are much more 
significant in terms of safety; in a steam boiler, the drum level is a key parameter. This parameter 
represents the quantity of water in the boiler more accurately than a direct measurement of the water 
level, due to changes in mass caused by differences in temperature. By monitoring and controlling the 
drum level we can maximize steam quality and maintain the proper water quantity to prevent damage 
to the boiler. Too low a level could expose the water tubes to heat stress and damage; too high a level 
could allow water to go over the steam header, exposing the steam turbines to corrosion and damage 
[12, 13]. Steam pressures on the bus and the drum are the two other key variables, since they indicate 
the balance between the supply and demand for steam. The consequences of excessively high steam 
pressures are obvious and explosive. Thus, any deviation from normal values of steam pressure and 
drum level must be corrected immediately, whereas abnormal values of the other variables can be 
tolerated for a time period (which must be defined by the system designer).  
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We classify the detectable variables into two loops, the control loop and the safety loop, which operate 
as follows: 
• an alarm from the safety loop will shut the system down; 
• alarms from the control loop are processed on-line and either resolved or, if this is 
unsuccessful, the safety loop is triggered. 
The wrapper envelopes the PID controllers as shown in Fig. 4: it monitors the values of variables 
which go into and come out from the PID controllers. Three inputs – the drum level and the steam 
pressures on the drum and bus – are classed as belonging to the safety loop, and all other variables 
(PID outputs to the boiler (via the ROS), set-points and other input variables) belong to the control 
loop.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Variable categories around the PID controller(s) 
5 Error Recovery  
Error recovery transforms a system state that contains errors into an error free state. The transformation 
typically takes the form of either backward or forward error recovery [2]. Backward error recovery 
returns the system to a previous (assumed to be correct) state; typically, the techniques used are 
application-independent and often operate transparently for the application (e.g. atomic transactions 
and checkpoints). Forward error recovery aims to move the system into a correct state using knowledge 
about the current erroneous state; this recovery is application-specific by its nature. The most general 
framework for achieving forward recovery is exception handling [3]. It is not difficult to see that 
backward error recovery is not generally applicable in dealing with OTS items [4].  
Protective wrappers offer a structured approach for incorporating fault tolerance measures in systems 
with OTS items. In previous work [1] we demonstrated how error detection can be developed in a 
wrapper by cyclically checking for each type of possible error identified during the analysis phase. We 
characterise these errors into three distinguishable types: (a) signal not available, (b) signal violating 
specifications, and (c) unacceptable signal oscillations. When the wrapper detects an erroneous 
situation it immediately initiates recovery action by classifying the error and invoking a corresponding 
exception handler. Three possible recovery actions are suggested here.  
• Handler1:  
- Reset the signal to a standard normal value and send an alert to the operators. 
• Handler2:  
- Wait ∆t, if error resolved, take no action;  
- Otherwise, send an alarm to the operators and wait ∆T, if error resolved, take no action; 
- Otherwise, invoke handler 3. 
• Handler3: 
- Shutdown the system and send an alarm to the operators. 
In Handler2, the delay times ∆t and ∆T would be determined by the wrapper designer after consulting 
the system specification. In the Simulink model we took ∆t as 500 steps and ∆T as 1500 steps, 
representing reasonable values for a genuine industrial application. 
Analysis of the error types for different signals then enabled us to define a recovery strategy, which is 
discussed in the following subsection, and then illustrated in Fig. 5. 
Wrapper 
 
PID controller(s) 
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5.1 Recovery Strategy 
In the case of an erroneous situation detected for a set-point value, whether it is missing, out of 
specification or oscillating is of secondary interest. The wrapper is aware of the appropriate range of 
set-point values, and Handler1 provides appropriate recovery by forcing the input to a suitable value, 
and alerting the operators (since the mistake could be theirs, or an internal corruption). 
The situation is rather different when a PID output value is detected as being erroneous, but the same 
response can be made; either by adopting standard operating output values, or by storing a recent 
history and using a smoothed average, the wrapper can apply Handler1 to impose a valid output signal 
which should result in stable, though suboptimal, performance from the boiler system. It would be 
possible to differentiate between the three error types in terms of determining the signal value to be 
imposed, but we have not exploited this in our simple demonstrator. 
Now consider inputs to the PID controllers which are not set-points, and are not in the safety loop. 
When one of these is detected as erroneous there is little point in feeding a fixed value to the PID, since 
this will not reflect the actual conditions monitored by the ROS. However, given that there is no 
immediate safety concern, the optimistic strategy of “wait and see” may be successful; indeed for a 
short interval it may not be appropriate even to alert the operators, since the phenomenon may be 
completely transient in nature (it would, of course, still be logged for an off-line report). If the problem 
persists an alarm report to the operators may enable them to cure the problem, but if not an eventual 
shut-down is inevitable. So the wrapper can deploy Handler2; again, although differentiation of the 
response in line with error type is possible, we have not exploited this option. 
Lastly, consider the input variables in the safety loop: drum level, drum and bus steam pressures. 
Detecting an erroneous condition on one (or more) of these variables implies a risk to safety, and the 
natural response is to shut the boiler system down, despite the economic consequences.  Handler3 
provides this response, but to illustrate error category differentiation in our model we invoke Handler2 
in the particular case of an oscillating value. The justification is that although a missing signal value or 
an out of specification value indicates a clear and present risk of accident, an oscillating value within 
specification does not necessarily pose the same immediate threat – the oscillations may die out or an 
operator response could stabilise the situation. If the oscillations persist then Handler3 will still be 
brought into play. Of course, in a real boiler system this strategy would only be acceptable if justified 
by a safety case.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Recovery action implemented by exception handlers 
 
5.2 Exception Handling 
When any of the errors above is detected an exception is raised. Error diagnosis is performed to select 
the appropriate handler, depending on which variable caused the exception to be raised. The diagnosis 
is straightforward for variables in the control loop: in the safety loop, we differentiate between error 
categories. 
Errors detected by the protective wrapper can be caused by malfunctioning of the OTS item, by faults 
arising in the ROS, or by misinterpretation between the OTS item and the ROS (Fig. 1). In the PID 
case study considered here, the exception handlers implemented in the protective wrapper always act at 
the level of the integrated system, which constitutes the exception handling context [4]; they can send 
an alert or alarm signal to the operator, replace an erroneous value with an alternative “normal” value, 
await a natural rectification, or (when safety requires it)) shut the system down. 
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Clear separation of the normal and abnormal system behaviour by employing exception handling in the 
wrapper facilitates the integration of the OTS PID into the composite system [4]. 
6 Implementation of the Recovery Actions in MATLAB 
This section illustrates the operation of recovery when an error occurs, with the wrapper implemented 
in the MATLAB model. The example presented below applies error recovery by invoking Handler1. 
The error was introduced by artificially simulating an incorrectly valued pressure set-point. At step 
5000 the operator “accidentally” recalibrates the pressure set-point to be 94 instead of the normal value 
of 9.4. 
Fig. 6 shows the boiler system behaviour with no wrapper protection; note that steam pressure on drum 
is superimposed over bus steam pressure, so only one pressure variable is actually displayed.  
The first chart of Fig. 6 shows that the faulty pressure set-point results in a huge drop in the drum level 
followed by a peak at too high a value before returning to a level close to normal. Similarly, the three 
PID outputs shown in the second chart jump up beyond their specified levels after step 5000 but return 
to normal performance by step 7000. Very much more serious is the drum steam pressure, which the 
first chart shows rising and remaining at an excessive level. 
Fig. 7 shows the behaviour of the boiler system with wrapper protection active. The wrapper detects 
the incorrect value of the set-point and invokes Handler1. Consequently the set-point is very quickly 
corrected, and the impact on system behaviour and on the other variables is greatly reduced. From the 
two charts in Fig. 7 we see that although there are some alterations to the variables when the error 
occurs, the changes are actually quite minor, and lie within the range of the specifications for the 
system.  
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Fig. 6. Erroneous pressure set-point – boiler system with no wrapper. Drum level and feed water 
flow are outside permitted ranges: pressure on drum rises to an excessive level. 
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Fig. 7. Erroneous pressure set-point – error recovery by Handler1. Variables are corrected to be 
within permitted ranges 
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Generic Error Recovery Strategy   
Since an OTS item that has been integrated into a system is treated as a black box, only the inputs to 
and outputs from the OTS are available to be monitored for error detection. The inputs in a control 
system can be partitioned into two groups, where the first group consists of configuration variables 
(often under operator control as set-points), while the second group provides dynamic status 
information from the system under control. A wrapper providing protection in the system can monitor 
these two groups of inputs, and the outputs, and can attempt to distinguish different categories of 
erroneous behaviour. As three simple base categories we proposed: missing value, out of range value, 
and oscillating value. 
In response to a detected error situation, over these groups of variables and categories of error, the 
protective wrapper can apply an exception handling framework to attempt to recover from the error. 
Simplistic generic recovery strategies that we have considered are: do nothing, alert the human 
operators, change variables to normal values, and stop the system. In our boiler system example we 
decided that erroneous outputs from the OTS could be over-ridden by the wrapper; in effect, the 
wrapper will take over the role of the OTS in erroneous situations, but can only provide a standard set 
of normative outputs. In the same way, the wrapper can over-ride configuration variable inputs to the 
OTS, particularly when these are input set-points. Our Handler1 is used to over-ride erroneous values. 
We need to analyse in more detail the other input variables delivered to the OTS by the ROS, since 
forcing a change here could only have a very indirect influence on the variable itself, via the OTS and 
its outputs back to the controlled system. One important aspect is with respect to safety and we used 
this to apply a hierarchy of recovery. For variables with a direct impact on safety we “recover” by 
shutting the system down (Handler3); for other variables, not in the safety loop, we first wait to see if 
the error is transient, then to see if human intervention will achieve recovery, and if that too is 
unsuccessful then the system must be shut down in any case (Handler2). 
Wrapper design in any specific case would proceed by analysis of the state space of variables, the 
errors that could be detected, the damage assessment that could be conducted, and the recovery 
strategies that could be devised, bearing in mind the implications on system operations from both a 
mission (economic) and a safety perspective. 
7.2 Complexity of the Wrapper 
A wrapper inserted into a system as a protective component performs an important role in improving 
the reliability of the integrated system. In discharging this role it is clearly essential that the wrapper 
does not itself contribute to an increase in failing behaviour from the overall system. Ideally, the 
wrapper should introduce no faulty behaviour itself, and should capture and rectify all faulty behaviour 
it encounters. Perhaps the best general guidance here is that the most reliable designs will usually be 
those that are simplest. The OTS PID controllers may, of necessity, involve highly complex algorithms 
to achieve the optimised boiler performance that is their goal. But in designing an effective wrapper we 
are likely to find that a simple and effective recovery strategy will outperform something overly 
sophisticated. First, a simple design is more likely to be implemented correctly, and second, a more 
complex strategy may have unforeseen interactions with the control environment and these could 
detract from effectiveness. 
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Fig. 8. Comparison of effects on performance of boiler system with two kinds of wrapper designs  
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Fig. 8 shows a comparison of the impact on two of the variables in the safety loop for the boiler 
system, with two different wrapper designs responding to the situation described in section 6 (the 
pressure set-point changed from 9.4 to 94 at step 5000). One wrapper applies recovery by using 
Handler1 to reset all three PID outputs to standard values, while the other wrapper only resets the feed 
water flow and air flow, leaving the coal feeder rate at its computed value. We can see from Fig. 8 that 
the more simplistic strategy of only changing two of the variables leads to a swifter and more stable 
recovery. 
This paper has summarised our recent work in the development of protective wrappers as a structured 
approach to providing error detection and recovery in systems utilising OTS items. This approach 
embodies error classification and corresponding recovery strategies implemented within an exception 
handling framework. 
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